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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1988-89 TERM
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
This article summarizes some of the United States
Supreme Court's recent decisions in criminal law. In
terms of its impact on federal prosecutions, the most
important decision of the term may have been Mistretta v.
United States, 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989), in which the Court
upheld the sentencing guidelines promulgated under the
Sentencing Reform Act. The guidelines were challenged
on a number of grounds, including separation of powers
and improper delegation of legislative authority.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Aerial Surveillance
The defendant in Florida v. Riley, 109 S.Ct. 693 (1989),
lived in a mobile home on five acres of rural property. A
greenhouse was located 10 to 20 feet behind the home. A
wire fence surrounded both structures, and a "Do not
enter" sign had been posted. Two sides of the greenhouse were enclosed. Although the other two sides were
open, trees, shrubs, and the home obscured the view.
Panels, some translucent and some opaque, covered the
roof. Two panels, however, were missing.
After receiving an anonymous tip, the local sheriff went
to Riley's property to investigate the cultivation of marijuana. Because the contents of the greenhouse could not
be viewed from the road, the sheriff used a helicopter. At
the height of 400 feet, he saw what he thought was marijuana and subsequently obtained a search warrant.
Riley moved to suppress the seized marijuana, arguing that the aerial surveillance was a search, conducted
without probable cause or a warrant. The Court rejected
his argument. A plurality believed that the case was
governed by California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). In
Cirao/o a fixed-wing aircraft flew over property at 1,000
feet, from which point marijuana was seen growing in the
defendant's yard. The Court ruled that the observations
made from the plane did not constitute a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because a
person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this context. The Court wrote:
In an age where private and commercial flight in the
public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitu-
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tionally protected from being observed with the naked
eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the
public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in
order to observe what is visible to the naked eye. /d. at
215.
The plurality in Riley did not believe that a helicopter,
flying at 400 feet, should be treated differently. Even
though a fixed-wing plane could not travel that low, it was
legal for a helicopter to fly at that altitude. Any member of
the public could have rented a helicopter and viewed the
greenhouse. The sheriff did no more. The plurality,
however, did comment: "This is not to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will always
pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply
because the plane is within the navigable airspace specified by law." 109 S.Ct. at 697. The plurality suggested that
an interference with Riley's right to use the greenhouse,
or the revelation of intimate details of the home, or undue
noise, wind, or threat of injury might lead to a different
result.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but wrote
a separate opinion. She believed that "the plurality's
approach rested too heavily on compliance with FAA
regulations whose purpose is to promote air safety and
not to protect" Fourth Amendment values. /d. Simply
because a helicopter can view the curtilage legally at
almost any height does not mean that a person does not
have an expectation of privacy from such an observation.
Riley lost, in her view, because there was reason to
believe that there is considerable public use of the
airspace at 400 feet. Thus, any expectation of privacy
that he did possess was not one that society was
prepared to accept as reasonable. She warned, however,
that flights at lower altitudes may be sufficiently rare to
violate reasonable expectations of privacy.

Stop and Frisk
Andrew Sokolow purchased two round-trip airline tickets from Honolulu to Miami. United States v. Sokolow,
109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). He paid cash, $2,100, from a roll of
$20 bills. He did not check any luggage and appeared
nervous. The ticket agent contacted the police, and
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to determine whether it is impractical to require a
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the
particular context. /d. at 1390.
Here, the Court believed that the warrant requirement
would not provide much additional protection for
employees but would exact a substantial cost to the Service. Under the program, drug testing was limited to
narrowly defined situations, and employees who sought
promotion or transfer were aware of these requirements.
There would be no special facts for a neutral and
detached magistrate to evaluate.
Next, the Court considered the probable cause
requirement. Prior cases had established an exception to
this requirement for certain types of administrative
searches:
[T]he traditional probable-cause standard may be
unhelpful in analyzing the reasonableness of routine
administrative functions, ... especially where the
Government seeks to prevent the development of
hazardous conditions or to detect violations that rarely
generate articulable grounds for searching any particular place or person ... Our precedents have settled
that, in certain limited circumstances, the Government's need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently
compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed
by conducting such searches without any measure of
individualized suspicion./d. at 1392.
The Court went on to hold that the Government's
interest was sufficiently compelling to validate the testing
program as it applied to those who were involved in drug
interdiction and those who carried weapons. Moreover,
Customs employees in these categories have a
diminished expectation of privacy. "Unlike most private
citizens or government employees in general, employees
involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect
effective inquiry into their fitness and probity." /d. at 1394.
The Court believed that the record had not been sufficiently developed to make such a determination concerning employees who handled classified material and thus
remanded on that issue.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct.
1402 (1989), involved the constitutionality of a drug testing program that covered railroad employees. The
program was implemented under the authority of the
Federal Railroad Safety Act. It required testing after most
railroad accidents and permitted testing under certain
other conditions. The Court's analysis paralleled that of
Von Raab. It first concluded that the testing program was
a governmental search under the Fourth Amendment.
Then it considered the reasonableness of the procedure,
balancing the need against the privacy intrusion. Again,
the Court upheld the search as reasonable.

subsequent investigation revealed that the telephone
numberlisted did riot m~ateh the name (Andrew Kray),
under which he was traveling. Moreover, his stay in
Miami was to last only 48 hours even though the trip from
Honolulu to Miami takes 20 hours. When he returned to
Honolulu, he was stopped by the police, and a drug dog
alerted when it sniffed his bag; 1,063 grams of cocaine
were found. The Ninth Circuit held the stop invalid, finding that the DEA agents did not have reasonable suspicion to stop.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Under Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), the police can stop and briefly detain a
person if the officer has reasonable suspicion supported
by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot. In
determining reasonable suspicion, the courts look at the
totality of the circumstances. According to the Court, the
facts supported a finding of reasonable suspicion, a standard which requires less than a showing of probable
cause. The use of an alias, although not determinative, is
a relevant fact. The use of cash, amounting to $2,100 and
paid in $20 bills, is also relevant. Moreover, few travelers
would spend 20 hours on a flight and then only 48 hours
in Miami before returning home. "Any one of these
factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is
quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken
together they amount to reasonable suspicion." /d. at
1586.
The fact that some of these factors are part of the DEA
drug courier profile did not undercut their validity. The
Court wrote:
A court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the
factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that
these factors may be set forth in a "profile" does not
somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as
seen by a trained agent. !d. at 1587.
Drug Testing
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109
S. Ct. 1384 (1989), involved the urinalysis program operated by the United States Customs Service. One of the
Service's responsibilities is the seizure of contraband,
including illegal drugs. Employees who sought a transfer
or promotion to certain positions were subject to drug
testing-those involved in drug interdiction, those who
carried weapons, and those who dealt with classified
information. The Union challenged the testing program,
arguing that it violated the Fourth Amendment rights of
the employees.
The Supreme Court upheld the testing program, at
least as it applied to those employees who were involved
in drug interdiction or who carried firearms. Initially, the
Court concluded that the urinanalysis program was a
governmental search and thus subject to the Fourth
Amendment. Accordingly, the critical question was
whether the search was reasonable. Typically, a reasonable search is one based upon a warrant and probable
cause. However, if a special governmental need is
involved, these requirements may be dispensed with:
[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special
governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's
private expectations against the Government's interest
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CONFESSIONS
Miranda-Custody
While driving, the defendant in Pennsylvania v. Bruder,
109 S. Ct. 205 (1988), was stopped by the police for traffic
violations. After the officer smelled alcohol and observed
stumbling movements, he administered a field sobriety
test. The officer also asked about alcohol use, and
Bruder responded that he had been drinking. When
2
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witnessed the victim leaving the car and that she told him
immediately that she had been raped.
The defense contended that the act of intercourse was
consensual. The defense theory was that the victim and
Russell were having an extramarital relationship and that
the rape story was made up to explain why she was
disembarking from the defendant's car. By the time of the
trial, the victim and Russell were living together, but the
trial judge refused to permit cross-examination about this
fact. The judge believed that this information would prejudice the jury against the victim because she was white
and Russell was black. The jury acquitted the codefendant and convicted Olden of sodomy only.
On review the Supreme Court reversed per curiam.
The right of confrontation includes the right to conduct
reasonable cross-examination. In particular, "exposure of
a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of
cross-examination." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17
(1974). The Court's cases consistently reaffirm this right.
For example, the Court recently held that
a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from
engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination
designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the
part of the witness, and thereby "to expose to the jury
the facts f(om which jurors ... could appropriately
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the
witness." Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680
(1986), quoting Davis, supra, at 415 U.S. at 318.
In this case Olden had consistently maintained that the
alleged victim lied because she feared jeopardizing her
relationship with Russell. Thus, inquiry into her current
living arrangement with Russell would have been relevant to impeachment. Foreclosure of this line of questioning violated Olden's right of confrontation. Moreover, this
error could not be considered harmless-especially in
light of the jury's inconsistent verdict and acquittal of the
codefendant.

Bruder failed the sobriety test, he was arrested. His
incriminatory statements were admitted at trial. A state
appellate court, however, ruled the statements inadmissible as violative of Miranda.
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. According to
the Court, the case was controlled by Berke mer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), which held that persons
subjected to temporary traffic stops were not entitled to
Miranda warnings. Although the person is seized within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, there is nb
"custodial interrogation," the triggering mechanism for
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
In other words, only persons in custody are entitled to
Miranda warnings, and a traffic stop does not amount to
custody. This rule was based on two factors. First, traffic
stops were usually brief, unlike the station house interrogations discussed in Miranda. Second, traffic stops
commonly occur in public, a situation far removed from
the police dominated stationhouse depicted in Miranda.
Once a person is arrested, however, Miranda warnings
are required. In a footnote the Court indicated that
detaining a suspect for "over one-half an hour" and
questioning him in a "patrol car" would also trigger the
Miranda safeguards, even in the absence of a formal
arrest.

Miranda - Warnings
Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989), involved
the adequacy of warnings given pursuant to Miranda.
Before confessing to attempted murder, Eagan was given
warnings, which included the advice that a lawyer would
be appointed "if and when you go to court." Eagan
argued that this advice suggested that a suspect is not
entitled to counsel unless charges are filed against him,
and that only those who can afford an attorney are entitled to one before questioning.
On review, the Supreme Court rejected these arguments. The Court noted that it had "never insisted that
Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in
that decision." /d. at 2879. In California v. Prysock, 453
U.S. 355 (1981), the Court had remarked that "the 'rigidity' of Miranda [does not] exten[d] to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant," and that
"no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy its strictures." /d. at 359.
In this case the Court believed that the warnings, as a
whole, conveyed the information required by Miranda.
The initial warnings included the following statement:
"You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we
ask you any questions, and to have him with you during
questioning." In addition, Eagan was told that he had the
right to the. advice and presence of a lawyer even if he
could not afford to hire one, and that he had the right to
stop answering questions until he talked to a lawyer.

PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE
In Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), a
10-year old boy was kidnaped and sodomized. After he
was released, his mother took him to a hospital, where a
physician treated him for rectal injuries. The doctor also
used a "sexual assault kit" to collect evidence. This
involved the use of swabs to collect samples, which are
then transferred to slides. The slides were turned over to
the police, who placed them in a secure refrigerator. The
boy's clothing was also collected, but it was not refrigerated or frozen. Tests to determine whether sexual contact
had occurred were conducted, but further tests to identify
blood group substances were not conducted. Nor were
tests performed on the clothing until much later. Youngblood was eventually identified and charged based on a
photo display. His conviction was subsequently overturned by an Arizona appellate court because expert
testimony indicated that timely tests on properly
preserved semen samples could have produced results
that might have exonerated him. According to the court,
this failure to preserve the evidence violated due process.
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. The issue
raised went beyond the Brady line of cases, which

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
The defendant in Olden v. Kentucky, 109 S.Ct. 480
(1988), was charged with kidnaping, rape, and sodomy.
The alleged victim testified that Olden had tricked her
into leaving a bar and then raped her with the assistance
of a codefendant. She was then driven to the house of
Bill Russell, where she was released. Russell also testified as a prosecution witness. He told the jury that he
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requiretf1e prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence
to the defense. Brady v. 1\/laryiani:l, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Here, the
prosecution disc:losed all the relevant material. What it
failed to do was test the evidence immediately or
preserve it in a way that would permit the defendant to
test it later.
A recent case; California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479
(1984), raised a similar issue. In that case the defendant
sought to suppress the results of an intoxication test
because the State had failed to preserve breath samples.
The Court rejected the due process argument because
the State had acted in good faith; the chance of exculpation had the sample been preserved was slim, and alternativeways of contesting the test results were available.
In Youngblood the Court focused on the good faith
requirement. While good faith is not a requirement in the
Brady-suppression cases, the Court believed it was
determinative in a failure to preserve situation: "We
therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can show
bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve
potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of
due process of law." 109 S.Ct. at 337. According to the
Court, the record possibly showed negligence but not
bad faith.

391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). The principal issue is how to
define this category. The Court's early cases focused on
the nature of the crime and whether the crime was one
triable by jury at common law. later cases, however,
sought a more objective standard. By the time Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), was decided, a plurality of
the Court stated: "[W]e have found the most relevant
such criteria in the severity of the maximum authorized
penalty." /d. at 68. In Baldwin the Court held that the right
to jury trial was triggered whenever the charged crime
carries a maximum authorized prison term greater than
six months. The Court, however, did not rule that a maximum term of less th?n $iX months imprisonment would
always be a petty offense. It left open the possibility that a
jury trial could be required, at least in some cases, even if
the maximum prison term was less than six months.
In Blanton the Court reaffirmed this possibility. A crime
punishable with a prison term less than six months was
presumed to be a petty crime, but this presumption could
be rebutted.
A defendant is entitled to jury trial in such circumstances only if he can demonstrate that any additional
statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the
maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so
severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a "serious" one.
This standard, albeit somewhat imprecise, should
ensure the availability of a jury trial in the rare situation
where a legislature packs an offense it deems "serious" with onerous penalties that nonetheless "do not
puncture the 6-month incarceration line." 109 S.Ct. at
1293.
Applying this standard, the Court found that Blanton
was not entitled to a jury trial. The fact that a minimum
term may be imposed was considered irrelevant by the
Court. Likewise, a 90-day license suspension did not take
DUI out of the petty offense category. One other aspect
of the statute was considered. In lieu of prison, a DUI
offender may be ordered to perform 48 hours of community service dressed in clothing identifying him as a DUI
offender. This scheme, however, did not make DUI a
"serious" offense, according to the Court.

PRESUMPTIONS
The defendant in Carella v. California, 109 S. Ct. 2419
(1989), was convicted of grand theft for failure to return a
rental car. The jury instructions adopted two statutory
presumptions. One required the jury to find intent to
commit theft by fraud if a rental car is not returned within
20 days after a demand is made by the owner. The other
presumption-reqiiifecrtlie~jury to return a finding of
embezzlement if a rental car is not return within five days
of the expiration of thelerase. ·
The Supreme Court found these instructions unconstitutional. Due Process requires the State to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970). Jury instructions that relieve the State of this
burden are constitutionally suspect. Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307 (1985)." Such directions subvert the
presumption of innocence accorded to accused persons,
and also invade the truth-finding task assigned solely to
juries in criminal cases." 109 S. Ct. at 2420. Since the
instructions in question were mandatory directives to the
jury, they "directly foreclosed independent jury consideration ofwhether the facts proved established certain
elements of the offenses ... " and they "also relieved the
State of its burden of proof articulated in Winship, namely
proving by evidE;Jnce every essential element of Carella's
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." /d.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Right to Consult
The defendant in Perry v. Leeke, 109 S.Ct. 594 (1989),
was convicted of murder, kidnaping, and sexual assault.
He claimed that he had not taken an active part in the
homicide or kidnaping and that his participation in the
sexual assault was due to duress. Evidence indicated
that he was mildly retarded, nonviolent, and could be
easily influenced by others. Perry took the stand after a
lunch recess. At the conclusion of the direct examination,
the trial judge ordered a 15-minute recess. He also
ordered Perry not to talk to anyone, including his defense
counsel.
Perry asserted that this order violated his right to counsel, an argument based on Geders v. United States, 425
U.S. 80 (1976). In Geders the trial court ordered the defendant not to consult with his attorney during an overnight
recess.
The Court ruled that this order interfered with the right

RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Blanton v. City of North las Vegas, 109 S.Ct. 1289
(1989), involved the petty offense exception to the right to
trial by jury. Blanton was charged with driving under the
influence, which carried a maximum prison term of six
months. His request for a jury trial was denied, and he
appealed on this ground.
The Court had long recognized "a category of petty
crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth
Amendment jury trial provision." Duncan v. Louisiana,
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to counsel. In Perry, however, the Court held Geders inapplicable. The Court ruled that the right to consult with an
attorney was not operative in this context:
[W]hen a defendant becomes a witness, he has no
constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while he
is testifying. He has an absolute right to such consultation before he begins to testify, but neither he nor his
lawyer has a right to have the testimony interrupted in
order to give him the benefit of counsel's advice. 109
S.Ct. at 600.
Once the accused takes the stand, he is subject to
cross-examination, and often cross-examination
"depends tor its effectiveness on the ability of counsel to
punch holes in a witness' testimony at just the right time,
in just the right way." /d. at 601. Permitting consultation
between direct and cross-examination "grants the
witness an opportunity to regroup and regain a poise and
sense of strategy that the unaided witness would not
possess." /d. Accordingly, the trial court could refuse a
recess during the taking of testimony. It this is so, the
"judge must also have the power to maintain the status
quo during a brief recess in which there is a virtual
certainty that any conversation between the witness and
lawyer would relate to the ongoing testimony." /d.
The Court distinguished Geders because it involved an
overnight recess. In such a situation consultation would
cover subjects other than the defendant's testimony. For
example, trial tactics and plea negotiations might be
discussed. On such matters the defendant has a right to
consult with his attorney.

Anders Brief
Penson v. Ohio, 109 S.Ct. 346 (1988), involved the
application of an earlier decision, Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967). Prior to Anders the Court had held
that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a criminal
defendant the right to counsel on a first appeal as of
right. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). In
Anders the Court held that this right could not be denied
based on counsel's bare assertion that the appeal was
without merit. If appellate counsel concluded that the
appeal was frivolous, he could move to withdraw. The
motion, however, had to be "accompanied by a brief
referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal." /d. at 744. Moreover, the appellate
court must conduct its own examination of the record to
determine if the appeal is frivolous.
In Penson appellate counsel submitted a certification
of a frivolous appeal. The court of appeals permitted the
withdrawal even though a briefhad not accompanied the
certification and before the court had reviewed the
record. When the court did review the record, it concluded that counsel's certification that the appeal was without merit was "highly questionable." The court found
several arguable claims. Indeed, the court found that
plain error had been committed in one jury instruction. It
reversed on that count, but upheld the conviction on the
remaining counts.
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. According to
the Court, the process was flawed in several respects.
First, appellate counsel should not have been permitted
to withdraw without first submitting an Anders brief.
Counsel's failure to tile such a brief lett the Ohio

court without an adequate basis tor determining that
he had performed his duty carefully to search the case
tor arguable error and also deprived the court of the
assistance of an advocate in its own review of the cold
record on appeal. 109 S.Ct. at 351.
Second, the court erred by permitting the withdrawal
prior to its own examination of the record. Finally, and
"most significantly," the court tailed to appoint new counsel after it determined that several arguable claims existed. Once the court recognized a nonfrivolous claim, the
appellant is entitled to counsel under Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Anders is a limited exception,
applicable only when there is no merit in an appeal. This
much is clear from the Court's prior cases. In McCoy v.
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 108 S.Ct. 1895 (1988), the
Court had written: "Of course, it the court concludes that
there are nonfrivolous issues to be raised, it must appoint
counsel to pursue the appeal and direct that counsel to
prepare an advocate's brief before deciding the merits."
/d. at 1904-05.

Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees
Christopher Reckmeyer was indicted on drug charges.
Pursuant to a federal forfeiture statute, the indictment
sought forfeiture of specified assets in Reckmeyer's
possession. Reckmeyer and his attorneys from the firm
of Caplin & Drysdale sought to exempt attorney fees from
forfeiture. Petitioner argued that the statute infringes on
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and the
due process guarantee. The Court rejected both arguments. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
The right to counsel of choice is a limited right. It a
defendant can afford counsel, the prosecution is generally prohibited from interfering with his choice. However, a
"defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford." Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153, 159 (1988). The forfeiture of assets intended as
payment of attorney fees does not, according to the
Court, infringe upon this limited right. Simply put, the
money is not the defendant's to spend in the first place.
A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to
spend another person's money tor services rendered
by an attorney, even if those funds are the only way
that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of
his choice. A robbery suspect, for example, has no
Sixth Amendment right to use funds he has stolen
from a bank to retain an attorney to defend him if he is
apprehended. 109 S. Ct. at 2652.
The same is true with forfeiture, which under the
applicable statutes, vests title in the United States at the
time of the criminal act giving rise to forfeiture. Moreover,
the Court found the Government's interest in forfeiture to
be substantial; such funds are used to support law
enforcement activity, to permit the return of property to
rightful owners, and to undermine the economic power of
organized crime and drug enterprises.
GUILTY PLEAS
In United States v. Broce, 109 S. Ct. 757 (1989), the
defendants, Ray Broce and Broce Construction Co.,
were charged with rigging bids and suppressing competition tor highway projects. Two indictments were
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returned-one relating to bids on a particular project in
April1978 and anotlier for a different project in July 1979.
Both defendants pleaded guilty to both indictments.
Subsequently, the defendants attacked their convictions
on the ground that only one conspiracy was involved
rather than two." Different defendants charged with
rigging bids had prevailed on this theory. The Tenth
Circuit accepted this argument and reversed.
The Supreme Court disagreed. By pleading guilty to
two agreements, which started at different times and
embraced different objectives, the defendants conceded
guilt to two separate offenses. Even if they miscalculated,
they are estopped from challenging the plea. They had
the opportunity to go to trial and dispute the "two
conspiracy" theory but chose to forego that right. The
Court's cases had held that such erroneous assessment
did not invalidate a voluntary plea. In Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Court wrote:
A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely
because he discovers long after the plea has been
accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality
of the State's case or the likely penalties attached to
alternative courses of action. More particularly, absent
misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by
state agents, a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently
made in light of the then applicable law does not
become vulnerable because later judicial decisions
indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise. /d. at
757.
Accordingly, the general rule is that "a voluntary and
intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person,
who has been advised by competent counsel, may not
be collaterally attacked." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,
508 (1984). Although the Court had recognized exceptions to this rule, those exceptions were held to be
inapplicable.

historically had provided absolute immunity from
reprosecution.
The defendant in Nelson argued that his case was
governed by Burks. Here, the conviction was reversed
because evidence had been erroneously admitted and
the court determined that without the inadmissible
evidence, there was insufficient evidence to convict. The
Supreme Court, however, saw a difference. Burks was
based on a distinction between reversals involving trial
errors and those involving insufficient evidence. Nelson's
reversal was based on a trial error, and a retrial would
afford him the opportunity to obtain a fair readjudication
of guilt free from,error. Moreover, had he successfully
objected to the inadmissible evidence at trial, the prosecutor would have had the opportunity to introduce a
different prior conviction to support the recidivist charge.
Civil Sanctions
United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989),
involved a civil penalty which the Court decided
constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
Halper was convicted of submitting 65 false claims under
the federal Medicare program. While working for a medical laboratory, he submitted claims for a $12.00 reimbursement when the cost of the procedure should have
been $3.00. The total amount of the fraud was $585. He
was convicted on all65 counts as well as 16 counts of
mail fraud. He was subsequently sentenced to imprisonment for two years and fined $5,000.
The Government then instituted a civil action under the
False Claims Act. Based on the criminal verdict, the trial
court granted summary judgment. Under the act, a
person is liable for $2000 plus two times the amount of
damages for each count. Thus, a statutory penalty of
more than $130,000 was required.
Halper argued that this penalty constituted double
punishment in violation of the double jeopardy guarantee, and the Supreme Court agreed. The Court
acknowledged that both a civil and criminal penalty may
be imposed for the same conduct, and determining
whether a penalty is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction. The issue, in the Court's view, was
whether the civil penalty was punitive rather than
compensatory. The legislature's labeling of the penalty
as criminal or civil was not determinative. Instead, whether the penalty served the aims of retribution and deterrence controlled.
We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy
Clause a defendant who already has been punished in
a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial,
but only as a deterrent or retribution. /d. at 1902.
The Court went on to comment that the line between
remedial and punitive is often not precise, and that therefore reasonable liquidated damages and fixed-penaltyplus-double-damage provisions would be permissible.
However, the present case went beyond these acceptable means of establishing damages. The "civil penalty
sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational
relation to the goal of compensating the Government for
its loss, but rather appears to qualify as 'punishment' in
the plain meaning of the word." /d.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Retrial- Sufficiency of Evidence
The defendant in Lockhart v. Nelson, 109 S.Ct. 285
(1988), was sentenced to an enhanced prison term under
a state habitual offender statute. The statute became
operative if a defendant had been convicted of four prior
offenses. In a later habeas proceeding, the defendant
was able to show that one of the prior convictions had
been the subject of a pardon, and thus could not be used
for enhancement. The State, however, announced that it
would introduce a different conviction, which it had not
previously used, to bring the defendant within the
recidivist statute. The defendant objected on double
jeopardy grounds, arguing that without the pardoned
conviction, there was insufficient evidence-in effect, an
acquittal on the recidivist count.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The prohibition against successive prosecutions does not bar a
retrial of a defendant who succeeds in gaining a reversal
on appeal or in collateral proceedings. United States v.
Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S.
463 (1964). The Court recognized an exception to this
rule in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), for those
cases where the sole grounds for a reversal is the insufficiency of the evidence. The Court believed that reversal
on this ground was the equivalent of an acquittal, which
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Amendment. Such persons would be profoundly or
severely retarded and lack the capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their actions. They, however, would rarely reach the point of execution. The insanity defense
would shield most from conviction. Moreover, the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of the insane; that is,
someone who is not aware of the punishment or why they
are about to suffer it. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986).
Penry, however, did not fall in this category. He is mildly
retarded. He was found competent to stand trial, and the
jury rejected his insanity defense. Moreover, only one
state prohibits the execution of the retarded. Ford v. Wainwright was easily distinguished because no state permitted the execution of the insane and 26 states explicitly
forbid it. Finally, there was no other compelling evidence
of a national consensus on this issue. Accordingly, the
Court rejected this aspect of Penry's argument.
Penry did succeed, however, on another argument.
The trial court had failed to instruct the jury that it could
consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence of
mental retardation in determining the appropriateness of
the death penalty. Such consideration was required by
earlier cases. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).

Right to Counsel
Joseph Giarratano, a death row inmate in Virginia,
initiated a 1983 action against state officials, arguing that
he had a right to appointed counsel while pursuing
collateral relief in connection with his death sentence.
The Court rejected this argument. Murray v. Giarratano,
109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
The Court held that its prior cases did not support a
right to counsel in this context. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), recognized a right to counsel at trial, and
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), recognized
such a right for the initial appeal. However, the Court
drew the line in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), in
which it had held that the right to counsel does not
extend to discretionary appeals. The function of counsel
differs at different stages of the criminal process. At the
trial the State is haling the defendant into court and
attempting to overcome the presumption of innocence.
The defendant needs counsel as a shield. In contrast, at
the appellate stage, the defendant uses counsel as a
sword to upset a presumptively valid adjudication of guilt.
Consequently, the justification for counsel differs.
Based on this rationale, the Court had held in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), that there was no
federal constitutional right to appointed counsel for indigent prisoners seeking state postconviction relief. Giarratano, however, argued that Finley did not control in
death penalty cases. The Court disagreed. State collateral proceedings are not constitutionally required and
serve a more limited purpose than either the trial or
appeal. Moreover, while the Eighth Amendment sometimes imposes higher standards at the trial stage of capital cases, it does not necessarily impose higher
standards during the appellate or collateral review
stages.

Juveniles
Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), required
the Court to determine whether the imposition of the
death penalty on persons who committed crimes at the
age of 16 or 17 violated the Eighth Amendment. In the
preceding term the Court had concluded that the
Amendment was violated by the execution of a juvenile
who had been 15 years old at the time of the offense.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988). The
deciding vote in that case, however, was cast by Justice
O'Connor. She again cast the deciding vote in Stanford,
but this time she found no constitutional violation. She
distinguished Thompson. Unlike that case, "it is sufficiently clear that no national consensus forbids the imposition of capital punishment on 16 or 17-year old capital
murderers." /d. at 2981.

Retarded Prisoners
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), concerned
the execution of the retarded. Penry was convicted of
rape and murder. He was diagnosed as having organic
brain damage and had an 10 between 50 and 63, which
indicates mild to moderate retardation. His mental age
was 6 and 1/2, and his social maturity was that of a 9 or
10 year old. The jury rejected his insanity defense and he
was sentenced to death.
One of the issues before the Court was whether the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a mentally
retarded person with Penry's reasoning ability. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment recognizes
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (plurality). In determining such "evolving
standards," the Court has looked to objective evidence of
how society views a particular punishment today, as
evidenced by legislative enactments and jury
sentencing.
Initially, the Court traced the evolution of the treatment
of the retarded at common law. Here, the evidence
supports the proposition that the common law prohibition
against the execution of "idiots" would make their execution cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
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